



A Model-driven development framework for highly Parallel and  
Energy-Efficient computation supporting multi-criteria optimisation

# Railway use-case AMPERE Webinar June 27<sup>th</sup> 2023

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


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# GTSI mission in AMPERE




- Providing RAILWAY Use case as application of ODAS (Obstacle Detection and Avoidance System) to the Florence Tramway
- Railway use-case DSML Model: ODAS system model made by Capella and AMALTHEA.
- Capella extension to deal with safety aspects associated to use case
- Cooperation with partners to create a tool chain from Capella to Amalthea by a dedicated bridge.
- Software Kernel from ODAS in collaboration with UNISI: Kalman filter and Observer (later better described in the real-time part).
- ODAS Safety approach and relating constraints to use case to feed activities of partners developing the technological solutions



# ODAS

- ODAS (Obstacle Detection and Avoidance System) is a GTSI system that is under finalization and that will become a product for the Tramway market.
- ODAS recently passed the MAIN GATE examination that is the last technologic verification step that GTSI performs to new systems before they are allowed to become products.
- ODAS prototypes (PoC) were installed on three vehicles of the Florence Tramway.





# ODAS Installation on prototypes

ODAS relies on sensors mounted on the tram nose:

- Cameras
- LiDAR
- RADAR


Control system based on XAVIER NVIDIA board



Screen capture of verification tool for sensors' data and their fusion



# ODAS Model



## ODAS overview



- **Data from sensors are collected independently one from each other:**
  - 100 ms LiDAR raw data
  - 92 ms RADAR raw data
  - 40 ms for video (25 frames per second)
- **Data processed for spatial synchronization (e.g. homography and distortion correction) and time synchronization (data from different sensors)**
- **Detection of objects**
- **Data association to establish when different detections from different sensors refer to the same objects**
- **Tracking of objects. A Kalman filters track each detected object up to a maximum number (now set to 60). In case the number of detected objects exceeds the maximum number, the farthest one is not tracked.**
- **Collision checker evaluates if the estimated position of each object can lead to a collision, in order to warn the driver.**

# ODAS and Safety (1/2)



- Use cases have been used as a source of *non-functional* requirements to test AMPERE ecosystem
- Preliminary Hazard Analysis identified safety requirements on
  - ODAS system
  - AMPERE ecosystem (ex. generated SW must comply to EN50128 standard)
- Modelling of ODAS system safety requirements triggered a modification to the DSML tools at different design levels
  - Inception design: Capella
  - Detailed design: Amalthea

# ODAS and Safety (2/2)



- Capella DSLM modification
  - Tag “Safety-critical”

Applied Property Values:

Name	Value
Node1	ROS
Safety-critical	true

Bridge  
(by TRT)

- Amalthea DSLM modification
  - Tag “SILx”

Applied Property Values:

Name	Value
Node1	ROS
Safety-critical	true

Property	Value
Name	LIDAR_Processing
Multiple Task Activation Limit	EX 0
Preemption	<preemption>
Stimuli	Stimuli
Tags	Tag Node1, Tag SIL4

Property	Value
Name	CAMERA_Processing
Multiple Task Activation Limit	EX 0
Preemption	<preemption>
Stimuli	Stimuli
Tags	Tag Node1, Tag SIL0




# Use case evaluation



- AMPERE ecosystem has been evaluated by applying the toolchain to the railway use case

- Capella model generation..... [OK]
- Amalthea model generation through Bridge.. [OK]
- Code generation through SLG..... [OK]
- C++ code build through LLVM..... [OK]
- Execution on target platform..... [OK]



# Thank you



[www.ampere-euproject.eu](http://www.ampere-euproject.eu)



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
# BACKUP SLIDES



# Ongoing work and open topics (4/5)

## 2oo2 Architecture


- Thales Switch Control Unit
- HW Redundancy
- Voting mechanism



# SIL (Security Integrity Level)



- SIL is definitely important in RAILWAY domain.
- Technologies which cannot achieve highest SIL level are non applicable to Railway domain



S = Extent of damage  
 S1 minor injury of a person  
 S2 serious, irreversible injury of one or more people or death of one person  
 S3 death of several people  
 S4 disastrous effects with several dead

A = Likelihood of people being in the area  
 A1 rarely to slightly more often  
 A2 frequently to continuously

G = Danger prevention  
 G1 possible under certain conditions  
 G2 barely possible

W = Likelihood of occurrence  
 W1 very small  
 W2 small  
 W3 relatively high

